Quorum modes

TKeeper supports two custody modes:

Choose threshold mode when one compromised peer must not be able to sign alone. Place shares across independent hosts and administrative domains so one compromise cannot reach the threshold.

Threshold guarantees

Each peer stores one share and validates an operation before participating. Signing or threshold decryption completes only with enough accepted contributions; the private key is not reconstructed by the normal protocol flow.

This protects against:

• compromise or theft of fewer than threshold shares
• one malicious or careless operator controlling one peer
• unilateral key use by one TKeeper host
• some Byzantine peer behavior, where the protocol can reject or identify invalid contributions

Policy enforcement also becomes quorum-dependent when honest peers hold matching policy state and independently validate the same request. A compromised minority may approve locally but cannot complete the cryptographic operation alone.

Imposter evidence is protocol-specific. FROST, GG20, and threshold ECIES can identify some invalid contributions. Threshold ML-DSA validates transcripts, but a normal rejection-sampling abort is not evidence of a malicious peer.

What threshold mode does not guarantee

Threshold mode does not:

• preserve confidentiality or integrity after at least threshold peers are compromised
• guarantee availability when too few healthy peers can participate
• make inconsistent or malicious policy accepted by a quorum safe
• remove the need for host, network, seal, backup, and audit controls
• undo exposure that happened while a key previously existed in mono form

The threshold is a security boundary and an availability dependency. Select t and n together with failure-domain placement and recovery objectives.

Operational cost

Threshold operations add peer networking, session deadlines, coordinated deployment, per-peer sealing, consistency recovery, and more failure states. ML-DSA adds bounded retries because a healthy signing attempt can abort during rejection sampling.

Plan for:

• loss or sealing of a peer
• internal TLS or trust failures
• partially completed lifecycle operations
• version or feature drift between peers
• session timeout and retry behavior
• per-peer backup and recovery without collapsing shares into one failure domain

When mono is acceptable

Mono retains authentication, permissions, authorities, four-eye control, time policy, and audit, but one process holds full private key material. A host compromise is therefore a key compromise.

Use mono when that risk is explicitly acceptable: local development, low-impact workloads, or a controlled bootstrap phase. Do not describe mono as threshold custody or protection from a malicious host.

Promotion to threshold

TKeeper can promote a mono identity with:

POST /v2/keeper/quorum/promote

Promotion distributes the existing identity into threshold state; it does not create a history in which the key was never whole. Backups, memory captures, or prior compromise may retain the mono key. Rotate or run a new DKG when prior exposure cannot be accepted.

Target peers must already be initialized and unsealed with matching threshold and total. See Quorum Promotion.

Decision rule

Use threshold when a single-host compromise must not expose the key. If operational constraints require mono, account for full-key exposure in the risk and recovery plan.